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THE PROBLEM OF CANONICAL AMBIGUITY IN ALl
V. FEDERAL B UREA U OF PRISONS
Roderick M. Hills, Jr.*
No single ideal of exactness has been laid down; we do not know what we should
be supposed to imagine under this head-unless you yourself lay down what is to be so
called. But you will find it difficult to hit upon such a convention; at least any that
satisfies you. I
Textualists seem to like textual canons of statutory construction2 and with
apparently good reason. Canons seem to make apparently sparse text more determinate.
Such "intrinsic aids" also apparently do not require courts to inquire into evidence of
statutory purpose extrinsic to the statute's text. I will suggest below, however, that the
Court's decision in Ali v. Federal Bureau of Prisons3 illustrates how these textualist
advantages of textual canons might more apparent than real. Ali illustrates how the
intelligent application of the canons requires inquiry into extra-textual statutory purpose.
Moreover, the purposive character of the canons is unrelated to Karl Llewellyn's famous
claim that "there are two opposing canons [of statutory construction] on almost every
point." 4 One could not eliminate this essentially purposive character, even if one pruned
the list of canons to eliminate the more purposive ones, as suggested by Justice Scalia.
One also could not make the canons less purposive by refusing to fine-tune them for
specific statutes, as suggested by Adrian Vermeule. 5 The problem is not that suggested
by Llewellyn-i.e., that textualist and purposivist canons conflict with each other.
Instead, the problem is that we do not know what it would mean to apply any canon
mechanically without regard to a particular statute's purposes. Even when we know
which canon to apply, that canon nevertheless itself can constitute an ambiguous rule
that requires interpretation. If one insists that the canon must function as a mechanical
algorithm, then one will be forced to create meta-canons to govern the canons' own
* William T. Comfort III Professor of Law, New York University Law School.
1. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations § 88, 42' (G.E.M. Anscombe trans., MacMillan Co.
1958).
2. Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law 25 (Princeton U. Press 1997)
("Textualism is often associated with rules of interpretation called the canons of construction-which have
been widely criticized, indeed even mocked, by modern legal commentators.").
3. 128 S. Ct. 831 (2008).
4. Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons about How
Statutes are to be Construed, 3 Vand. L. Rev. 395, 401 (1950).
5. Adrian Vermeule, Interpretive Choice, 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 74, 140-41 (2000).
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application in ambiguous cases-and such a meta-canon will itself encounter ambiguities
requiring yet further refining rules, and so on, ad infinitum. As I shall suggest below,
this prospect of an infinite regress suggests that the mechanistic view of canons is a
misstep. Instead, canons are better seen as exemplars of the essentially purpose-driven
character of language: They are rules of thumb reminding us that grammatical etiquette
is always tightly connected to linguistic mission. Seen as purposive rules, canons are
useful tools, but they are not tools from which hard-core textualists should take much
comfort. Canons create as much textual ambiguity as they resolve; one can reasonably
view canons as serving precisely the function of surfacing ambiguities in text that courts
might otherwise overlook, thereby creating opportunities for the court to consider the
purpose of the enactment lying behind the text.
I. EJUSDEM GENERIS IN ALI V. BUREAU OF PRISONS
At the heart of Ali is a three-way debate about how to apply the ejusdem generis
canon. Two of the opinions (Justice Kennedy's four-vote dissent and Thomas' majority
opinion) debate the scope of this canon without saying much about the purpose of the
Federal Tort Claims Act, which was the underlying statute being construed. This debate
between Justices Kennedy and Thomas reproduces the sense of legalistic futility
conveyed by Llewellyn's famous columns of mutually contradictory canonical "thrusts"
and "parries. '6 Justice Breyer's dissent, by contrast, plays the role of Karl Llewellyn
himself, sidestepping the canonical debate entirely by focusing instead on extrinsic
evidence of statutory purpose without reference to the proper application of the canon.
The specific issue in Ali was whether the exception to the Federal Tort Claims
Act's waiver of immunity for claims arising out of the "detention" of property covered
prison officials who lost Ali's prayer rug and Quran, on the ground that those officials
constituted "any officer of customs or excise or any other law enforcement officer"
referred to by the waiver exception. 7 Justice Thomas emphasized that the ordinary
meaning of the term "any... law enforcement officer" encompassed prison guards.
8
The Ali majority refused to read this phrase narrowly to encompass only law
enforcement officers acting in the capacity of customs or excise officers, because such a
reading rendered the residual catchall clause superfluous. According to the majority, any
official who carried out customs or excise duties was likely "any officer of customs or
excise" by virtue of their duties, irrespective of whether they were formally employed by
the Department of the Treasury.9  The residual clause's reference to "any law
enforcement officer," therefore, served no purpose unless it expanded the coverage of the
exception beyond officers acting in the capacity of "any officer of customs or excise."
The majority also noted that the Civil Assets Forfeiture Reform Act, which reinstituted
6. To illustrate the indeterminacy of the canons, Llewellyn listed 28 canons in two parallel columns, the
right-hand column labeled "[t]hrust" and the left-hand column labeled "[p]arry." The "thrusts" tended to be
maxims urging the judge to stick with the text, while the "parries" tended to be exhortations to read text in light
of some purpose that bare text slighted. Any lawyer, Llewellyn implied, would be able to draw on one or the
other columns to achieve whatever interpretive result they desired. Llewellyn, supra n. 4, at 401-06.
7. 128 S. Ct. at 834.
8. Id. at 836-38.
9. Id. at 835-37, 839-41.
[Vol. 44:501
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the waiver of immunity for all claims by innocent co-owners of property detained by
"any... law enforcement officer" seizing property "under any provision of Federal
law," 10 was superfluous if the exception to the waiver applied only to officials acting like
"officer[s] of customs or excise," because such officers do not enforce any laws except
excise or customs laws. As for rendering superfluous the reference to "'any officer of
customs or excise,"' the Court dismissed this objection to a broad reading of the catchall
phrase by observing that the phrase "may have simply intended to remove any doubt that
officers of customs or excise were included in 'law enforcement officers."' II
Justice Kennedy's dissent, by contrast, observed that, if one construed the term
"any ... law enforcement officer" literally, then the clause's reference to "any officer of
customs or excise" would seem to be superfluous, because customs and other revenue
officers were surely no less "law enforcement officers" than prison officials. 12  To
preserve some role for the reference to customs and excise, therefore, Justice Kennedy's
dissent for four justices invoked the ejusdem generis canon: The apparently general
reference to all law enforcement officers must be construed to refer only to law
enforcement officers in the same genre as "officers of customs or excise"--say, Drug
Enforcement Agency officials confiscating contraband at the border. 13 Justice Kennedy
insisted that this narrow reading of the catchall reference to "any ... law enforcement
officer" would not render it surplusage, because there were some officers (for instance,
in the Drug Enforcement Agency or Coast Guard) who enforced revenue or contraband
laws even though they were not formally "officer[s] of customs or excise."
In short, Justice Thomas's and Kennedy's opinions seemed to confirm Karl
Llewellyn's prediction: The ejusdem generis canon was essentially indeterminate
because either a broad or narrow reading of "any ... law enforcement officer" would
render some text superfluous, thereby violating the spirit of the canon. As if channeling
from Llewellyn himself, Justice Breyer's dissent dismissed the canons as "simply
crystalliz[ing] what English speakers already know" 14 and, in any case, likely to be
"'countered ... by some maxim pointing in a different direction."' 15 Justice Breyer
instead urged the Court to look to the larger purpose of the underlying statute, echoing
Llewellyn's admonition that, "[i]f a statute is to make sense, it must be read in the light
of some assumed purpose." 16 According to Justice Breyer, quite apart from the textual
details of the clause, it simply made no sense to bury a general immunity for all
executive officers in an obscure provision that was manifestly concerned with revenue
laws. 17 By contrast, it made perfect sense to provide tort immunity only to officers who
executed revenue laws because "[o]ther statutes already provided recovery for plaintiffs
harmed by federal officers enforcing customs and tax laws but not for plaintiffs harmed
10. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c)(1) (2006).
11. Ali, 128 S. Ct. at 840.
12. Id. at 841-49 (Kennedy Stevens, Souter & Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
13. Id. at 843-44.
14. Id. at 850 (Breyer & Stevens, JJ., dissenting).
15. Id. (quoting Cir. City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 115 (2001)).
16. Llewellyn, supra n. 4, at 400.
17. Ali, 128 S. Ct. at 849-52 (Breyer & Stevens, JJ., dissenting).
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by all other federal officers enforcing most other laws."']8
Ali's three opinions, in short, are together a familiar example of a classic legal set
piece-the debate between the purposivist and textualist over how to construe the law.
This sort of debate is as ancient as St. Paul's warning that "the letter killeth, but the spirit
giveth life." 19 But one should not let the familiar battle between the letter and spirit of
the law to obscure the unusual aspect of Ali. Both Justices Thomas and Kennedy are
statutory literalists, invoking (for the most part 2 ) only sources approved by textualism.
Their disagreement, therefore, reveals more about the internal difficulties of textualism
than Justice Breyer's sidebar on why text must be supplemented by extrinsic sources.
II. THE PROBLEM OF CANONS WITH AMBIGUOUS APPLICATION
At the core of Kennedy and Thomas's disagreement is the problem of canons with
ambiguous application-what I shall call "canonical ambiguity." As an example of
canonical ambiguity, consider ejusdem generis. The intuition underlying ejusdem
generis is that the legislature wants every term in a series of nouns to make a difference
to meaning. Therefore, an enumeration of both specific and general categories should
construe the latter narrowly in order to give independent effect to the former, by
converting the list of narrower terms into an implicit principle limiting the broader term.
For instance, the Court reads "'any other class of workers engaged in ... commerce." to
refer only to workers engaged in transportation-related activities in order to give some
independent effect to the preceding reference to .'seamen' and .'railroad
employees."'
2 1
So understood, ejusdem generis is prone to two sorts of ambiguities. First, one has
to infer some unwritten limiting principle from a series of specific terms; second, one has
to minimize the wastage of words in applying the canon even when any interpretation of
a statute will inevitably waste words. It is difficult to imagine how one can intelligibly
resolve these ambiguities without referring to the purposes of the statute that one is
construing.
Consider, for instance, how ejusdem generis would apply to the series
"Plesiosaurus, Brachiosaurus, Ceratosaurus, or any other dinosaur." The reference to
"any... dinosaur" seems to make superfluous the three references to particular species
of dinosaurs, thereby calling for application of the canon. However, one could infer
several different limiting principles from those three references: Each specific species is,
for instance, a word of five syllables as well as a dinosaur from the Jurassic period.
Which limiting principle is the "correct" one? Presumably, one would want to know the
purpose of the series: If the series is being used as part of a rule in a spelling bee, then
the number of syllables might be more relevant than if the series is part of a rule for an
archeological dig.
As a real-life instance of this problem of inferring a common principle from a
18. Id. at 851.
19. II Corinthians 3:6 (King James).
20. Justice Kennedy briefly alludes to legislative history at Ali, 128 S. Ct. at 847, but his opinion is
otherwise innocent of references to purposive sources extrinsic to statutory text.
21. Cir. City Stores, Inc., 532 U.S. at 113-15 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2000)).
[Vol. 44:501
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series of terms, consider Begay v. United States, another decision from the 2007 Term.
2 2
Begay held that the series of crimes listed in the Armed Career Criminal Act's
("ACCA") definition of "violent felony"2 3 "all typically involve purposeful, 'violent,'
and 'aggressive' conduct"24 and, therefore, do not include the offense of driving while
intoxicated. However, the inference that purposeful violence is the most relevant
common attribute of "burglary, arson .... extortion, [or any crime that] involves [the]
use of explosives" 25 requires a defense. Why not, instead, rely on the magnitude of the
risks created by the enumerated offenses rather than the intentions of the criminals who
produce those risks? It seems odd to answer this question without attempting to consider
the purpose of the series. If the point of the provision is to deter firearm possession by
anyone who has been convicted of criminally risky activities, then the manner by which
the risk is produced seems irrelevant. If the purpose of the provision is to impose extra
punishments on especially culpable conduct, then the nature as well as the consequences
of that conduct ought to matter. Accordingly, the majority referred to the purpose of the
ACCA as manifested in its title and legislative history to support its inference that the
specific terms' most relevant common attribute was purposeful violence against
persons.
26
In short, if one is engaged in the enterprise of inferring unwritten common
attributes from a series of written terms, then one must necessarily have recourse to some
principle outside of text to choose between the competing attributes that characterize the
written series equally well. The best candidate for such a principle is statutory purpose.
Ejusdem generis is, at its heart, a purposive canon.
There is a temptation to decry such a purpose-based choice as a violation of
textualist tenets. But this accusation should be directed against any use of the ejusdem
generis canon because ejusdem generis necessarily requires one to draw a non-textual
attribute from a written series. In his concurrence, Justice Scalia decried what he took to
be the Begay majority's "piecemeal, suspenseful, Scrabble-like approach to the
interpretation of this statute" that, in Justice Scalia's opinion, "engrafts" a non-textual
limit against the letter of the law.27 According to Justice Scalia, the majority wimped
out of the austere demands of textualism by taking "ever-ready refuge from the hardships
of statutory text" in "the (judicially) perceived statutory purpose" of deterring
intentionally violent crime.
2 8
But Justice Scalia's criticism seems simply to reject the very premise of the
ejusdem generis canon, which is that fidelity to written text requires courts to infer
unwritten limiting principles from specific written terms in order to prevent the latter
from being rendered nugatory. Justice Scalia urged in his Begay concurrence that the
only relevant factor in determining whether an offense qualified as a "violent felony"
22. 128 S. Ct. 1581 (2008).
23. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (2006).
24. 128 S. Ct. at 1586 (citing U.S. v. Begay, 470 F.3d 964, 980 (10th Cir. 2006) (McConnell, J., dissenting
in part)).
25. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B).
26. Begay, 128 S. Ct. at 1585-86.
27. 128 S. Ct. at 1589 (Scalia, J., concurring).
28. Id. at 1590 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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was whether the offense created a sufficiently high objective probability of serious
physical injury to another person.29 But Justice Scalia's interpretation of the statutory
definition in the ACCA rests wholly on a contestable reading of the broad residual
clause's reference to any crime that "otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious
potential risk of physical injury to another." 30 The term "serious potential risk" does not
obviously refer to "objective risk" rather than "significantly culpable risk." Both the
majority and the dissent, therefore, are adding an unwritten limit to the residual clause,
because this is what ejusdem generis requires. The only question is whether the
majority's or the dissent's unwritten limit best captures the "spirit" of the preceding
enumeration-and this seems inevitably to be a question of statutory purpose.
The opinions in Ali reproduced precisely this debate among textualists. Justice
Thomas urges a broad reading of "any... law enforcement officer," while Justice
Kennedy urges a narrow reading. The former seems to render the term "any officer of
customs or excise" superfluous; the latter seems to leave little for the broad residual
clause to do. There is no textualist resolution to the impasse: The canon's injunction
against wasted words means that textual principles will be sacrificed no matter how one
reads the text.
This is not to say that one cannot resolve the impasse in Ali, but only that any
resolution will have to be rooted in some account of Congress' likely purpose in enacting
the provision. Indeed, Justice Thomas admits as much when he argues that a broad
interpretation of the residual clause would not render the preceding terms superfluous:
"Congress may have simply intended to remove any doubt that officers of customs or
excise were included in 'law enforcement officers." '3 1 Such speculation about purpose
is a grudging acknowledgment that ejusdem generis's demand that every bit of text count
requires a purposive response.
Justice Thomas' invocation of some congressional purpose to clarify terms,
however, is unconvincing precisely because he does not take purposivism seriously. If
one is going to invoke an intent to clarify, then one needs to answer an obvious question:
Which term is in need of more clarification by the other term-"any officer of customs
or excise" or "any... law enforcement officer"? It is hard to imagine a non-purposive
approach to answering this question: The degree to which any term needs clarification
depends on the purpose of the term. As Wittgenstein notes, "[t]he sign-post is in order-
if, under normal circumstances, it fulfil[l]s its purpose." 32 It is not imprecise to express
the distance between the earth and sun in miles rather than inches, because measurement
in inches would serve no intelligible purpose in astronomy. Likewise, unless clarifying
the scope of "any... law enforcement officer" with a reference to "any officer of
customs or excise" would serve some purpose relevant to the statute, it is unintelligible
to say that such a reference removes any doubt. Ali needs to explain why there is any
doubt that customs or excise officers are "law enforcement officers" for the purposes of
enjoying immunity when they lose or damage detained property. By failing to offer any
29. Id. at 1588, 1589, 1591.
30. Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii).
31. Ali, 128 S. Ct. at 840.
32. Wittgenstein, supra n. 1, at § 87, 41'.
[Vol. 44:501
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such explanation, Justice Thomas indicates that his reference to Congress' possible
purpose is really a peremptory effort to disregard some text for the sake of other text. As
in Begay, this might be a perfectly legitimate mode of interpretation, but there is nothing
especially textualist about it.
III. ELIMINATING CANONICAL AMBIGUITY BY MINIMIZING DECISION COSTS
One might concede that ambiguities in canons' application cannot be resolved
textually but still insist on a resolution of canonical ambiguity that does not look to the
statute's purpose. Professor Adrian Vermeule, for instance, has urged that courts avoid
focusing on statutory purpose as a way of minimizing decision costs. 33 Like other meta-
canons used to resolve canonical ambiguity, however, Vermeule's principle of
minimizing decision costs is itself ambiguous. It is often not obvious how to minimize
decision costs, and interpreting laws to minimize decision costs invites expensive
litigation about which interpretation of a statute will be less expensive. In this sense, the
meta-canon of minimizing decision costs is a self-defeating theory-that is, a principle
that will be defeated if people consciously follow its demands. 34 Such a theory is not a
helpful meta-canon for deciding how to resolve canonical ambiguity.
According to Professor Vermeule, the benefits of trying to gauge how the median
member of Congress uses language or what that member intended by a particular choice
of words are extremely uncertain. 3 5 Given the limits of their knowledge and training,
judges are likely to err in reaching answers to these questions. By contrast, the costs of
these efforts to find the "right" interpretation of a statute (whatever "right" might mean)
are easy to ascertain and likely to be high: Decisions are delayed, dockets are crowded,
and lawyers' fees are increased by litigation over complex rules of statutory
interpretation in ways that judges can easily predict. Therefore, Vermeule urges what
one might call the "KISS principle": keep it simple, stupid, and thereby minimize the
costs of reaching decisions, which are the only costs that a judge can be confident about
predicting.3 6 Applied to the canons of statutory interpretation, the KISS principle urges
judges to focus on consistency over getting the right answer: Just pick a canon and stick
with it. This strategy of canon-picking "will conserve all the costs of argument over the
content of the canons" while allowing Congress "over time, [to] incorporate the content
of the background rules into its anticipations of judicial behavior."37
As Vermeule concedes, this canon-picking strategy does not address the problem
of choosing how to apply a canon with vague triggering conditions. 38 Everyone on the
Ali Court already agrees that ejusdem generis is on the list of acceptable canons: The
dispute in Ali is about deciding how ejusdem generis applies to a specific statute. One
might, however, solve this problem by creating mechanical meta-canons to define how a
canon like ejusdem generis applies in ambiguous situations. One could, for instance,
33. Vermeule, supra n. 5.
34. Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons 5 (Oxford U. Press 1984).
35. See Vermeule, supra n. 5, at 112-13.
36. See id. at 128.
37. Id. at 140.
38. Id. at 140 n. 262.
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decide that the canon will never be used whenever the list of specific terms preceding the
general catchall term has fewer than three members. Under this meta-canon, Ali would
be easy to decide: "[O]fficer of customs or excise" contains, at most, two terms, such
that the canon would not apply to limit the general catchall term "any... law
enforcement officer." On Vermeule's reasoning, the choice of meta-canon would not be
important, just so long as it was easy to apply. According to Vermeule, "the gains from
identifying the very best default rule, in any particular setting, will be overwhelmed by
the costs of making the identification." 39 Rather than worry about which canons (or
meta-canons) to adopt, courts should just "fix[] the system of canons with a minimum of
fuss.
' 4 0
However, fuss may be inevitable, because there might be no easy way to choose
which meta-canon is cheapest to apply. Take, once more, ejusdem generis: Any rule
governing its application could end up being very costly. For instance, if one applies this
canon frequently, then one will narrowly construe the catchall clause at the end of a
series of terms by inferring some limiting principle from that series. This limiting
principle, being unwritten and vague, will tend to invite costly litigation. In this sense,
ejusdem generis always increases decision costs. The desire to avoid these costs was one
of the reasons that Ali gave for disregarding the canon.4 1 On the other hand, if one
simply enforces the catchall term literally by ignoring the list of more specific nouns
preceding that term, then one will tend to sidestep controversies over the meaning of the
implicit limiting principle but only at the expense of expanding the reach of the statute.
Expansive readings of statutes that shift the status quo will increase decision costs simply
by creating more issues for courts to decide: By opening the court's doors to claims that
could have been cheaply barred with a narrower reading of the statute, the broad reading
floods the courts and litigants with a higher volume of judicial business. In short, there
is no easy way to determine whether it is administratively cheaper to encourage narrower
statutes confined by vague principles or broader statutes confined by bright-line rules.
Caminetti v. United States42 illustrates the dilemma. In Caminetti, the Court was
confronted with two possible applications of ejusdem generis to the Mann Act, each of
which could plausibly be said to minimize decision costs. The Mann Act prohibited the
transportation of "any woman or girl" across state lines for "prostitution or debauchery,
or for 'any other immoral purpose."'4 3 Drew Caminetti had taken his lover across state
lines for a tryst: Had he violated the statute? If "any ... immoral purpose" were
construed to mean only purposes similar to prostitution, i.e., purposes to engage in
actions involving financial exchange, then the indictment of Drew Caminetti could be
quashed, saving the expense of a criminal trial and blocking future similar prosecutions.
Justice McKenna in dissent urged such a reading of the statute, to avoid blackmail of
39. Id. at 141.
40. Vermeule, supra n. 5, at 141.
41. 128 S. Ct. at 839 ("[1] is not apparent what common attribute connects the specific items in § 2680(c).
Were we to use the canon to limit the meaning of 'any other law enforcement officer,' we would be required to
determine the relevant limiting characteristic of 'officer of customs or excise."').
42. 242 U.S. 470 (1917).
43. Id. at 485; White Slave Traffic (Mann) Act, Pub. L. No. 61-277, 36 Stat. 825 (1910) (codified as
amended as 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (2000)).
[Vol. 44:501
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persons who cross state lines with lovers-turned-informants seeking non-commercial
sexual adventures. 44 The majority also invoked ejusdem generis, but the Court derived
its limiting principle from the statute's general focus on sexuality, construing "any...
immoral purpose" to cover any purpose related to sexual immorality.45  This
construction saved the government the cost of proving whether a particular sexual
escapade was financially motivated, saving the prosecution and court some significant
costs of additional proof. But the interpretation also opened up the court to a stream of
criminal prosecutions that could otherwise have been avoided. By the 1920s, a majority
of Mann Act prosecutions were brought against unmarried persons who crossed state
lines to have sexual intercourse deemed to be immoral. 4 6  In effect, the Court had
predictably unleashed a "[m]orals [c]rusade," burdening the judiciary with a flood of
cases that earlier U.S. Attorneys General had believed belonged in state court.
47
Vermeule could respond that increasing the business of the judiciary does not
count as a "decision cost" if the purpose of the statute was indeed to shift the status quo
through expanded judicial power. (As it turns out, Representative Mann congratulated
the Caminetti Court for correctly capturing his purpose in drafting the statute48). But the
same could be said for the costs of interpreting vague statutes that take the form of
extensive briefing and lengthy docket time: If Congress really intended to enlist the
courts to grapple with difficult policy questions embodied in vaguely worded statutes,
then judicial efforts to grapple with these questions do not constitute a cost at all but
rather a positive benefit of conferring judicial wisdom (such as it is) on knotty policy
problems). Both sorts of costs are equally within (or outside) the power of courts to
predict. Based on Vermeule's theory of making decisions under conditions of
uncertainty, both ought to have equal weight (or weightlessness) in influencing the
court's theory of statutory interpretation. But, assuming as Vermeule does, that courts
lack the capacity to make difficult empirical decisions correctly, it is difficult to
understand why a court will be able to balance the costs of expanding a statute's reach
(by rejecting ejusdem generis) against the costs of contracting its reach (by invoking
ejusdem generis). The decision costs of considering decision costs, in short, are
prohibitive. Decision costs, then, will have limited utility as a meta-canon for
determining how to apply canons.
IV. ELIMINATING CANONICAL AMBIGUITY BY RESPECTING LEGISLATIVE DEALS
Professor John Manning offers a second justification for avoiding purposive
resolutions of canonical ambiguity, arguing that purposive interpretation-what he calls
44. Id. at 502 (referring to risk that, under a broad reading of statute, "[b]lackmailers of both sexes have
arisen, using the terrors of the construction now sanctioned by this court as a help-indeed, the means-for
their brigandage"). One might assert that ejusdem generis does not permit a single commercial term
("prostitution") to limit two broader terms ("debauchery" and "any other immoral purpose"). But this would be
an assertion in search of an argument: Justice McKenna could rightly respond that the proper application of the
canon requires such a reading to prevent "prostitution" from being rendered surplusage by the other terms.
Id. at 486-87 (citing U.S. v. Bitty, 208 U.S. 393 (1908)).
David J. Langum, Crossing over the Line: Legislating Morality and the Mann Act 150 (U. Chi. Press
1994).
47. Id. at 139.
48. Id. at 119.
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attentiveness to "policy context"--does not adequately respect the details of legislative
deals. 49  By looking to how a reasonable policymaker would carry out the general
purposes of a statute, purposivists overlook that Congress is not a single reasonable
policy-maker but rather a collection of actors with warring purposes who make policy
through messy compromises. These compromises often have no overarching rationality
beyond the desire to assemble a winning coalition to pass legislation. By contrast,
"semantic detail offers a singularly effective medium for legislators to set the level of
generality at which policy will be articulated-and thus to specify the limits of often
messy legislative compromises., 5 1  Minorities who exploit the vetogates of the
congressional law-making process can insure that the concessions that they extract as the
price of their support will be honored when text is honored, because those compromises
are most accessibly memorialized in text.
52
The idea that adherence to textual detail honors legislative deal-making is a
longstanding theme of textualists,53 but it does not provide one with much traction in
addressing the problem of canonical ambiguity. The canons, after all, are precisely the
sort of semantic context that, according to Professor Manning, is supposed to reflect the
legislative bargain. What does one do when the application of these linguistic norms
seems mired in ambiguity? The textualist's easy answer is to treat canonical ambiguity
as sufficient to justify recourse to extra-textual evidence of statutory purpose. 54 In Ali,
for instance, the debate between Justices Kennedy and Thomas over the proper
application of ejusdem generis suggests that Justice Breyer's purposivist response was
correct as a matter of textualism. Given the pervasiveness of canonical ambiguity,
however, this concession takes much of the force out of the textualist call to focus on
semantic context: If this commitment can be overturned by canonical ambiguity, then it
is a weak commitment indeed.
Quite apart from its practical limits, there are theoretical reasons to doubt the truth
of Professor Manning's claim that statutory text reflects legislative deals more nearly
than other evidence of legislative purpose. Professor Manning's claim rests on an
exceptionally narrow definition of what it means to consult legislative purpose,
identifying "purposivism" solely with "the work of Professors Hart and Sacks" and their
"celebrated Legal Process materials" containing "a highly influential rationalist approach
to legal analysis in general and statutory interpretation in particular." 55 As Manning
correctly notes, Hart and Sacks offer an anemic model of the legislative process that is
unlikely to reflect the details of legislative compromises. 56  Rather than focus how
interest groups resolve conflict, Hart and Sacks urge judges to identify the statute's
49. John F. Manning, What Divides Textualistsfrom Purposivists? 106 Colum. L. Rev. 70, 70, 76, 91, 96,
99 (2006).
50. Id. at 102-03.
51. Id. at 77.
52. Id. at 104 ("Semantic meaning provides the most-if not the only-reliable way for legislators to
identify the scope and limits of the policies they wish to adopt.").
53. See e.g. Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 533, 546-47 (1983).
54. Manning, supra n. 49, at 84 ("when a statute is ambiguous, textualists think it quite appropriate to
resolve that ambiguity in light of the statute's apparent overall purpose" (footnotes omitted)).
55. Id. at 86 (footnotes omitted).
56. Id. at 76, 78, 86, 90.
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general policy goals and fill in the details of the scheme by imagining how a rational
policymaker would accomplish those vaguely specified statutory objectives. 57 While
this idealization of the legislative process is actually rooted in realistic skepticism about
the impossibility of discerning the collective subjective intent of a multi-member body,58
it is not well-calculated to unearth all of the side-deals that are necessary to secure
passage of a law. These deals might not make the best rational public policy, but,
without them, the legislative business might grind to a halt.59 If one focuses only on the
general goal in the title of a statute, one might ignore the critical compromises (say, a
short statute of limitations, a annoying requirement to exhaust administrative remedies,
or an otherwise bafflingly narrow definition of prohibited conduct) that greased the
wheels sufficiently to get the law enacted in the first instance.
One can endorse Manning's criticism of Hart and Sacks's model of the legislative
process and yet reject his prescription of textualism. The Legal Process School, after all,
hardly exhausts the menu of alternatives to hard-core textualism. Manning may be
correct to note that Hart and Sacks's "materials have come to represent the canonical
statement of purposivism." 60 But it might also be that law and political science can do
better than the canonical versions of either textualism or purposivism.
In particular, judges could think like "reasonable deal-makers" as well as
reasonable policymakers. They could go beyond abstract statements of statutory purpose
to look for evidence of the legislative bargains that permitted the enactment of the
legislation in the first place. Barry Weingast and Daniel Rodriguez have pressed for a
"sophisticated intentionalism" in which judges determine the position of key
representatives exercising potential veto power over bills "6 1  This sort of "bargain-
friendly" version of Hart and Sacks's Legal Process theory would ask whether there is
any actual evidence that an interpretation of a statute aroused any opposition or even
interest from interest groups capable of influencing the law-making process.
United States v. Hayes62 from the Court's 2008 Term presents a good illustration
of how such "sophisticated intentionalism" might be effective in resolving canonical
ambiguity. In Hayes, the Court was confronted with an ambiguity in the Gun Control
Act of 1968's prohibition on possession of a firearm by any person convicted of "a
misdemeanor crime of domestic violence." 63  In 1994, Edward Hayes had been
convicted of battery in West Virginia state court. In 2004, Hayes was arrested and
57. See Henry M. Hart, Jr. & Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making and
Application of Law 1374-80 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., Found. Press 1994). This
approach to interpretation is hardly unique to Hart and Sacks. Identifying general ends and then approving
means that seem well-suited to those ends fairly describes Chief Justice John Marshall's theory of
constitutional interpretation in M'Culloch v. Md., 17 U.S. 316, 407 (1819) ("[The Constitution's] nature ...
requires, that only its great outlines should be marked, its important objects designated, and the minor
ingredients which compose those objects be deduced from the nature of the objects themselves.").
58. John F. Manning, Legal Realism and the Canons'Revival, 5 Green Bag 2d 283 (2002).
59. Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast, The Paradox of Expansionist Statutory Interpretations, 101
Nw. U. L. Rev. 1207 (2007) (noting that the prospect of judicial expansion of a statute's scope can deter the
legislature from enacting the statute).
60. Manning, supra n. 49, at 86 (footnote omitted).
61. Rodriguez & Weingast, supra n. 59, at 1229-33.
62. 129 S. Ct. 1079 (2009).
63. Id. at 1082 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (2000)).
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charged with illegal possession of a firearm under the Gun Control Act after the police
searched his house in response to a 911 call reporting domestic violence and discovered
a rifle. 64 The earlier assault had been committed against Hayes' former spouse, but the
state battery offense of which Hayes was convicted did not make this relationship an
element of the offense. The question, therefore, arose whether Hayes had been convicted
of "misdemeanor crime of domestic violence" by being convicted of a simple battery.
65
The Gun Control Act's definition of "misdemeanor crime of domestic violence" did not
specify whether the predicate misdemeanor identify as an element of the crime a
domestic relationship between aggressor and victim. If the defendant had been convicted
of simple assault that, as a matter of fact, been committed against a domestic relation,
then would such a conviction qualify under the statute?
The "last antecedent rule," a grammatical canon of construction applying modifiers
only to the immediately preceding antecedent noun, was relevant to the question because
the statutory definition of "misdemeanor crime of domestic violence" contained a
modifier, the placement of which rendered the definition ambiguous. 66 According to the
Gun Control Act:
[T]he term 'misdemeanor crime of domestic violence' means an offense that-(i) is a
misdemeanor under Federal, State, or Tribal law; and (ii) has, as an element, the use or
attempted use of physical force, or the threatened use of a deadly weapon, committed by a
current or former spouse, parent, or guardian of the victim, by a person with whom the
victim shares a child in common, by a person who is cohabitating with or has cohabitated
with the victim as a spouse, parent, or A uardian, or by a person similarly situated to a
spouse, parent, or guardian of the victim.
Did the modifier "committed by a current or former spouse" modify "an offense"
or "the use or attempted use of physical force"? If the former interpretation was correct,
then Hayes was covered by the Gun Control Act; if the latter, then Hayes was not
covered.
In his dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Roberts noted that, under "last antecedent"
canon, "'committed by"' modified "'use"' rather than "'offense,"' because "'use' was
much closer to, and contained within the same clause as, "'committed by. ''68 Moreover,
the phrase "an offense that... committed by a spouse" was nonsensical without the
addition of the verb "was." By contrast, it was not nonsensical (although it was
ungainly) to refer to "the use ... of physical force... committed by a ... former spouse."
The "last antecedent rule," therefore, seemed to suggest a narrow interpretation of
''misdemeanor crime of domestic violence" to refer to only those predicate offenses that
made the existence of a domestic relationship between the victim and perpetrator a
necessary element of the crime. According to Chief Justice Roberts, enforcing this limit
was important to respect the possible legislative compromise that led to the enactment of
§ 922(g)(9):
64. Hayes, 129 S. Ct. at 1082-83.
65. Id. at 1083.
66. Id. at 1086-87.
67. Id. at 1084 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A) (2000)).
68. Id. at 1089-91 (Roberts, CJ. & Scalia, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 44:501
12
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 44 [2008], Iss. 3, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol44/iss3/3
ALI V. FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS
Legislative enactments are the result of negotiations between competing interests; 'the
final language of the legislation may reflect hard-fought compromises.' Even if there were
sufficient sentiment to extend the gun ban, individual legislators might have disagreed on
the appropriate reach of the new provision. Some members might well have been willing
to extend the ban beyond individuals convicted of felonies, but only if the predicate
misdemeanor by its terms was addressed to domestic violence.
69
In short, the technical text may have reflected a legislative deal that a broad reading of
the statute would ignore.
The difficulty with Chief Justice Roberts' deal-based justification for the "last
antecedent" rule is that it ignored the canonical ambiguity inherent in § 922(g)(9). The
literal "last antecedent" before "committed by a current or former spouse" is "the
threatened use of a deadly weapon." As both the lower court and the majority noted,7° if
one applied the modifier only to the antecedent immediately preceding it, then the
statute's special punishments would apply to all defendants who were convicted of the
"use or attempted use of physical force" regardless of whether they had any domestic
relationship to the victim. Why not adopt this broad reading of the statute on the theory
that the "last antecedent" rule reflects some unspoken legislative bargain?
The obvious reason is that such a grammar-based distinction makes no sense from
the perspective of a likely rational deal-maker, let alone a rational policymaker. The
only interest group likely to oppose a broad reading of section 922(g)(9) were advocates
of rights to firearms like the National Rifle Association. However, imposing special
everyone who uses any sort of physical force in a crime (including force with a firearm)
hardly seems like a likely goal of advocates of gun rights. One can agree with Judge
Easterbrook that "statutes have length as well as direction" and still insist that limits on a
statute's "length" make sense as a coherent compromise. 7 1 Indeed, even textualists like
Chief Justice Roberts and his co-dissenter, Justice Scalia, were willing to ignore the
implausible application of the "last antecedent" rule to § 922(g)(9) without believing that
they were thereby refusing to enforce the terms of bargain.
In sum, an emphasis on semantic context provides no way of distinguishing deals
from linguistic accident. If one applies canons like the "last antecedent" rule
mechanically, then one can generate limits on statutory scope that are simply too
preposterous to resemble the product of any intelligible deal. In such a case, it is hard to
believe that there are no advantages to more purpose-based reasoning. One need not
engage in Hart-and-Sacks style invocation of abstract policy rationality when deciding
whether the grammatical details make sense. Instead, one could view the grammatically
correct reading through the lens of a rational dealmaker, asking whether any intelligible
array of interests could be imagined to have insisted on the canonical limit as a price of
their support.
69. Hayes, 129 S. Ct. at 1092 (Roberts, CJ. & Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
70. Id. at 1086 n. 6 (majority) (citing U.S. v. Hayes, 482 F.3d 749, 755 (4th Cir. 2007)).
71. Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 Harv. J.L. & Pub.
Policy 59, 63 (1988) ("[L]aws are born of compromise. Different designs pull in different directions. To use an
algebraic metaphor, law is like a vector. It has length as well as direction. We must find both, or we know
nothing of value. To find length we must take account of objectives, of means chosen, and of stopping places
identified. All are important.").
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Viewed by Rodriguez and Weingast's "sophisticated intentionalist," the Hayes
majority's reading of § 922(g)(9) seems less like the evasion of a legislative bargain and
more like an avoidance of grammatical inadvertence. The majority paid deference to
textualism by suggesting a couple of textual arguments against the dissent's and lower
court's invocation of the "last antecedent" rule.72 But the majority's more convincing
argument was that the dissent's narrow view of § 922(g)(9) "would frustrate Congress'
manifest purpose." 73 According to the majority, a narrow reading of § 922(g)(9) would
render the statute a "'dead letter' in two-thirds of the states upon enactment, because
when § 922(g)(9) was enacted, two-thirds of the states as well as the federal government
lacked any law specifically forbidding domestic violence. 74  "[W]e find it highly
improbable," the majority concluded, "that Congress meant to extend § 922(g)(9)'s
firearm possession ban only to the relatively few domestic abusers prosecuted under laws
rendering a domestic relationship an element of the offense."
75
Of course, as Chief Justice Roberts suggested, these limits on the scope of §
922(g)(9) could be the result of some bargain reflected only in the technical recesses of
the "last antecedent" rule. But such a bargain seemed improbable even to justices
sympathetic to textualism. 76 As the majority noted, there was zero evidence of any such
deal in the legislative record. No member of Congress actually called for limiting the
provision's scope based on the technical elements of the underlying conviction. Indeed,
it seems fanciful to believe that any member of Congress would draw a distinction
between spouse-beaters based on whether or not their indictment alleged the fact of their
marriage to their victim. Such a requirement would have the advantage (from a gun
advocate's point of view) of delaying the implementation of § 922(g)(9) in a state until
that state enacted the necessary domestic violence laws. But it is not obvious why an
advocate of gun-owners rights would want to tie the cause of gun rights to the cause of
spouse beaters, nor could any of the briefs cite evidence that advocates of rights to
firearms had opposed laws imposing special penalties on domestic violence. Further, it
is hard to see why insisting on proof of a domestic relationship would do much to
72. The majority noted that "element" was a singular noun that did not obviously refer to two elements (i.e.,
(1) use of force that is (2) committed by a person with a domestic relationship to the victim) and that
"'commit[ting]' a 'use'" of force was an awkward turn of phrase. Hayes, 129 S. Ct. at 1086-87. But neither of
these arguments seem much more than weak make-weights. As Chief Justice Roberts' dissent noted, the
Dictionary Act called for singular nouns to be treated as plural nouns, and, in any case, it is not obvious that
use of person against a particular class of victims counts as two distinct elements. Moreover, "use of force...
committed by a former spouse" is at least intelligible, while "an offense that ... committed by a ... former
spouse" is simply incoherent. Id. at 1090 (Roberts, CJ., dissenting).
73. Id. at 1087 (majority).
74. Id. (quoting Hayes, 482 F.3d at 762 (Williams, J., dissenting)).
75. Id. at 1087-88.
76. When Justice Scalia suggested the possibility of such a deal based merely on the idea that opponents
simply wanted to weaken the bill as much as possible, Justice Alito (among others) reacted with apparent
skepticism. Compare Oral Argument at *4, U.S. v. Hayes, 2008 WL 4892844 ("Justice Scalia: Well,
Respondent says that may be because a lot of people in Congress wanted it to be a dead letter. They would
have wanted the whole thing to be a dead letter. There are a lot of people who didn't like this statute because it
was a gun control statute.") with id. at *36 ("Justice Alito: Other than a desire to weaken this bill as much as
possible, can you think of any reason why Congress would have drawn the distinction that you're drawing
between States that have specific statutes relating to domestic violence misdemeanor statutes and those that
don't?"). For Alito's textualism, see Elliott M. Davis, Student Author, The Newer Textualism: Justice Alito's
Statutory Interpretation, 30 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Policy 983 (2007).
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safeguard the right to bear arms, given that proving up such a relationship would
generally be a trivial matter.
Why should consideration of these extra-textual policy reasons be barred by an
exclusive focus on the norms of grammar and style-what Professor Manning calls
"semantic context"? 77 There is no a priori reason why the terms of deals are best
memorialized in the details of grammar that most legislators are likely in any case to
overlook. Why assume that interest groups strike deals based on commas and semi-
colons rather than based on colloquies on the floor of Congress? If a canon like the "last
antecedent" rule leads to a limit on a statute that does not make much sense as a plausible
bargain, then it is not obvious why a court interested in enforcing such bargains would
not be well-advised to check the legislative history to determine whether anyone actually
contemplated such a deal. At the very least, the court might adopt the stance of a
"sophisticated intentionalist" and ask whether the grammar-based limit would make
sense from the point of view of any known interest group or political movement.
Applied to Ali, this purpose-based theory would ask whether there is any evidence
that any interest group ever sought blanket immunity for all law enforcement officers
from claims arising out of the detention of property. If there is no indication anywhere
of interest in such immunity in the legislative history, then one might find it odd to infer
such immunity from a general clause embedded in an exception to an immunity waiver
that is otherwise focused entirely on "officers of customs and excise" and "claim[s]
arising in respect of the assessment or collection of any tax or customs duty." Manning
might reasonably object that this sort of sophisticated intentionalism is costly and prone
to error, because it is unrealistic to believe that judges will be able comprehensively to
review such sources to detect every possible unwritten deal that drove the enactment of
legislation. But resolving canonical ambiguity does not require judges to uncover every
legislative bargain. Judges need only look for bargains relevant to the particular
canonical ambiguity at issue in the case. For instance, in trying to figure out whether to
read the catchall clause broadly, the Ali Court could ask whether there was any indication
in any relevant source-the Congressional Record, private groups' testimony, committee
reports, op-ed pieces, interest groups' websites, and so on-that anyone focused on
providing all "law enforcement officers" with immunity from liability for damaging or
losing property in their possession. If there is a total absence of any such evidence of a
legislative bargain in extra-textual sources, then why infer such a deal from stray words
in a clause that is ambiguously subject to ejusdem generis?
V. WHAT IS THE FUNCTION OF TEXTUAL CANONS?
Why use canons at all? If canonical ambiguities ought to be resolved through
examination of statutory purpose, then why not just cut to the chase and start with more
general statutory "context," as Justice Breyer suggests in his Ali dissent? 78 As this essay
suggested above, canons are not especially well-suited to reducing decision costs or
memorializing legislative deals. They do not make interpretation more mechanical but
77. Manning, supra n. 49, at 70.
78. 128 S. Ct. at 850 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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less so. They are not rules that fix the meaning of rules, for any such canonical code
would be a self-contradictory paradox, given that such rules would need further rules to
fix their meaning. Why refer to them at all?
It is worth considering the possibility that textual canons are devices for making
manifest the latent ambiguities in text that courts might otherwise overlook. As I have
argued above, canons that focus on the need to avoid wasted words such as noscitur a
sociis and ejusdem generis, for instance, do not actually reduce the ambiguity of text but
instead create new ambiguities, by imposing unwritten limits on phrases that, read in
isolation, seem clear and expansive. The statute in Ali, for instance, seems textually
"plain" to Justice Thomas simply because he decided to set ejusdem generis aside.
Ejusdem generis creates ambiguity by suggesting that "any" really does not mean "any."
But even canons, like the "last antecedent" rule, that do nothing more than offer
grammatical rules for matching modifiers with nouns create ambiguity in the sense that,
in cases like Hayes, they cannot be applied mechanically without giving rise to
absurdities.
Canons that bring latent ambiguities to the surface act as gate-keepers for
purposive readings of statutes. It remains settled doctrine even among judges and
scholars who support examination of statutory purpose that text has lexical priority over
other sources. 79  Even those opinions criticized most heavily by textualists for
prematurely consulting extra-textual evidence of statutory meaning make gestures
towards absurdities or, at least, oddities in the literal text before they invoke such extra-
textual evidence. 80 On the opposite extreme, the priority of text over rival sources is, of
course, the central tenet of textualism, which permits those other sources to be consulted
only after the text has been declared to be absurd or ambiguous.
8 1
By bringing ambiguities to the surface, canons create an opening for even
textualist judges to consider extra-textual evidence of statutory purpose (including the
purpose of enacting a legislative compromise) without licensing a wholesale
abandonment of text for free-wheeling judicial policymaking. Canons focus such
purpose-based inquiries on a few loose terms-for instance, dangling modifiers or
expansive concluding terms in a series of nouns-giving the court a reason based in
semantic usage to consider the policy context of a law. Thus, canons simultaneously
create the opportunity and cabin, judicial inquiry into statutory purpose. For judges who
do not fear judicial discretion to range over extra-textual materials, this cabining will
seem unnecessary. 82 For moderate textualists, however, the canons provide a text-bound
79. Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 32-33 (2006).
80. Public Citizen v. DOJ, 491 U.S. 440, 454 (1989) (stating that "[w]here the literal reading of a statutory
term would 'compel an odd result,' Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 509 (1989), we must
search for other evidence of congressional intent to lend the term its proper scope," but conceding that "'the
words used, even in their literal sense, are the primary, and ordinarily the most reliable, source of interpreting
the meaning of any writing' (quoting Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1945), affd, 326 U.S.
404 (1945))).
81. Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh, 543 U.S. 50, 66-67 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("I agree
with the Court's decision to proceed on the premise that the text is not altogether clear. That means that
examination of other interpretive resources, including predecessor statutes, is necessary for a full and complete
understanding of the congressional intent. This approach is fully consistent with cases in which, because the
statutory provision at issue had only one plausible textual reading, we did not rely on such sources.").
82. Id. at 65 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("In recent years the Court has suggested that we should only look at
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opportunity, rooted in ordinary usage, to go beyond text.
legislative history for the purpose of resolving textual ambiguities or to avoid absurdities. It would be wiser to
acknowledge that it is always appropriate to consider all available evidence of Congress' true intent when
interpreting its work product." (footnote omitted)).
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